



# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa



This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the West Africa (WA) region. The core countries of focus for this region are Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to any of the countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

The Mixed Migration Centre is a global network consisting of six regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration.

For more information on the MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit [mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

### **MMC's understanding of mixed migration**

“Mixed migration” refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people in mixed flows have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Those in mixed migration flows travel along similar routes, using similar means of travel - often travelling irregularly, and wholly, or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

#### **Front cover photo credit:**

Jean-Baptiste Joire (2017)

Women watching boats in Joal-Fadiout, Senegal, February 2017.

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
# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa

## Quarter 3 - 2019

### Key Updates

- **Displacement from Northern Nigeria to Maradi:** During the quarter ongoing insecurity in the northern Nigerian states of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina has led to further displacement, with [more than 40,000 Nigerians](#) now seeking refuge in Niger's Maradi region, and an estimated [210,354 displaced internally](#). Distinct from the Boko Haram incursions in northeastern Nigeria, the [situation in northwestern Nigeria](#) combines clashes between farmers and herders with increasingly extreme acts of vigilantism, banditry and kidnapping in a context characterized by weak state security.
- **West African migration to the Americas:** A growing trend in [African migration to the Americas](#) has coincided with evolving [US](#) and [Mexican](#) migration policies which are increasingly restrictive. As a result, thousands of African migrants – including West Africans from [Mauritania](#), [Ghana](#), [Togo](#), [Nigeria](#), [Gambia](#) are caught in limbo at Mexico's borders with the US and with Guatemala.
- **Displacement due to continued violence in Burkina Faso:** Continuing violence in Burkina Faso has led to substantial displacement within the quarter, with more than [288,994 internally displaced](#) as of mid-September. This is an [increase of nearly 100,000](#) over the last quarter.
- **Nigerian response to xenophobic attacks in South Africa:** Following attacks against some [1,000 foreign-owned](#) businesses in South Africa in early September, the Nigerian government boycotted a meeting of the World Economic Forum held in Capetown and stated its intention to bring more than [600 of its citizens](#) home to preserve their safety. South Africa had temporarily closed its diplomatic presence in Nigeria, but relations have since improved, with a South African envoy conveying his "[sincerest apologies](#)" to Nigeria's government.
- **Stranded migrants in Cameroon:** The International Organization for Migration (IOM) assisted [83 stranded migrants](#) to return to Burkina Faso and Togo from Cameroon on 12 September. The migrants were part of a larger group of 117 West Africans, primarily Burkinabés and Togoloese, who were headed to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. They were rescued at sea by the Cameroonian military and local fishermen after their boat ran out of fuel and began to capsize on 29-30 July.

## Regional Overview\*



\*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration flows within and out of West Africa.

# Mixed Migration Regional Updates

## West Africa region

The 21 August [Report of the Secretary-General](#) on Assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in Africa noted that the effects of interconnected armed conflict and violent extremism had led to increased displacement within the region over the period of 1 July 2018 – 30 June 2019. Numbers of internally displaced climbed from 1.9 million to some 2.5 million, and the number of refugees grew from 286,900 to 326,000. Almost 700,000 persons were stateless or at risk of statelessness. The situation has not improved over the last quarter.

**Burkina Faso's [state of emergency](#)** – initiated in December 2018 – was extended on 11 July, and will now remain in effect until 12 January 2020. Displacement numbers continue to rise sharply, with more than [288,994 internally displaced](#) as of mid-September. This is an [increase of nearly 100,000](#) within the last quarter. Despite the continued violence, the overall number of Malian refugees hosted in Burkina Faso was stable over this period, at approximately [25,719](#), with the majority ([95.5%](#)) remaining in the insecure northern Sahel region. This suggests that [secondary displacement](#) of Malian refugees has thus far not occurred, but remains something to monitor.

In **Mali** itself, the quarter saw persisting instability, with participants at the September 25<sup>th</sup> [High-Level Meeting on Mali and the Sahel](#) at the UN General Assembly expressing “concern about the rising levels of violence, the increasing number of civilian casualties and worsening humanitarian situation.” While the total number of Malian refugees hosted across the region (Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger) as of mid-September – [138,985](#) – stayed fairly consistent as compared to the previous quarter's number of [138,391](#), internal displacement increased by more than [20,000](#) (to 168,515) over the [previous quarter](#).

Ongoing violence in the northern Nigerian states of Sokoto, Zamfara and Katsina has approximately [doubled](#) the number of refugees who have fled into **Niger's** Maradi region since the last quarter, with the latest estimates from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at [more than 40,000](#). Distinct from the Boko Haram incursions in northeastern **Nigeria**, the [situation in northwestern Nigeria](#) combines clashes between farmers and herders with increasingly brutal acts of vigilantism, banditry and kidnapping in a context characterized by weak state security. From [January – August 2019](#) approximately 1,155 people were killed in Zamfara State, and about 330 in Sokoto and Katsina. As of 20 September, an estimated [210,354](#) persons were internally displaced within Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara states.

There has also been violence on the other side of the border, with [officials in Maradi](#) reporting some 31 people killed and 34 injured in 81 attacks by armed bandits in that same period, along with at least 92 persons kidnapped and 3,036 heads of cattle taken by the attackers. In early September the governor of Maradi hosted a [meeting](#) with his counterparts in Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara states to discuss cross-border crime, and to sign a memorandum of understanding relating to security. Nevertheless, at the end of September [UNHCR](#) stated their expectation of further cross border displacement as the situation in Sokoto state continues to worsen.

At the end of July the humanitarian community and government representatives in Nigeria took part in a commemoration marking [10 years since the beginning of the Boko Haram insurgency](#) in north-eastern Nigeria, and reiterating their commitment to assisting those affected. More than 27,000 civilians have been killed in the conflict, and [more than two million people are displaced](#) from their homes in northeastern Nigeria – the highest total since Boko Haram became active.

[Reports](#) indicate that the Nigerian government closed its border with **Cameroon** in August in order to prevent armed actors entering Nigeria under the guise of refugees. Nevertheless, some 4,964 Cameroonian refugees were registered in Nigeria in [July](#) and [August](#), bringing the total registered number as of the end of August to some 42,610. Driven across the border by [clashes](#) between the military and armed separatists, the majority of the refugees are women and children from anglophone areas in Cameroon. About half of them live in host communities in Nigeria. Given ongoing instability in Cameroon, UNHCR is predicting further cross-border movement from Cameroon to Nigeria.

## Returns

In August [134 Nigerian refugees](#), comprising [25 households](#) – 35 adults and 99 children – returned home from Minawao Camp in Cameroon under the auspices of UNHCR. At the same time, there are reportedly some [4,000 Nigerian refugees](#) in Minawao who have opted not to return.

As of 17 September, some [495 refugees](#) had voluntarily returned to Cote d'Ivoire within the quarter. This brought the total of returns to 1,572 for the year to date, with the majority (995) coming back from Liberia.

In a reversal from the typical pattern of north-south returns, IOM assisted [83 stranded migrants](#) to return to Burkina Faso and Togo from Cameroon on 12 September. The migrants were part of a larger group of 117 West Africans, primarily Burkinabés and Togoloese, who were rescued at sea by the Cameroonian military and local fishermen after their boat ran out of fuel and began to capsize on 29-30 July. Their numbers included [43 women and 24 children](#). The boat had originated in Ghana, but transited via Benin en route to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. One migrant from Burkina Faso shared that Europe had been his ultimate destination, reportedly expressing that “it is easier to travel to Spain through Equatorial Guinea because the central African state enjoys good diplomatic relations with its former colonial master and the two countries have Spanish as their official language.”

## Policy updates

In July UNHCR issued a new “[Position on Returns to Mali – Update II](#).” Acknowledging that there has been increased displacement of Malians, both internally and across borders, since its previous guidance from 2014, Update II attributes displacement to “persistent violence, intercommunity-clashes, human rights violations and a deteriorating humanitarian situation.” It calls on states to refrain from forcibly returning any Malians originating from the regions of Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Taoudenni, Ménaka, Mopti, Ségou and Sikasso, or from Nara, Kolikana, Banamba and Koulikoro *cercles*.

Following the Regional Dialogue on Protection and Solutions in the Framework of Forced Displacement in the Sahel, hosted by the Government of Mali and UNHCR, the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali,

Mauritania, Niger and Chad issued [conclusions](#) on 12 September. These touch upon humanitarian access and civil-military coordination; protection within the framework of the UN Plan of Action for the Prevention of Violent Extremism; access to asylum within the framework of massive displacement of refugees and of mixed movements; solutions to the problems of refugees, internally displaced persons and other civilian populations; access to civil status documents, identity documents and nationality.

A new [Anti-Trafficking Task Force](#) has been established in Borno State Nigeria, bringing together twenty organizations under the auspices of the Protection Sector Working Group. Recognizing that displacement increases vulnerability to trafficking, the Task Force will seek to include anti-trafficking approaches in ongoing humanitarian activities. It will be co-chaired by the National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) and the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development.

## Mixed migration from Africa towards North Africa and Europe

As of the end of July, migrants and refugees from four West African countries accounted for almost half of [arrivals to Spain](#) in 2019, with Malians comprising 14%, Guineans 13%, Ivoiriens 11% and Senegalese 8%. This is a reduction in numbers over the same period last year in all cases except for that of Senegal, which has shown a small increase. Whereas West African nations account for four of the top five countries of origin for arrivals in Spain through the Western Mediterranean route, only one West African nation is among the top five nationalities of [arrival in Italy](#) through the Central Mediterranean route. This is Côte d'Ivoire, which as of the end of August accounted for approximately 10% of arrivals to Italy in 2019, with a total of 518.

There had been [concerns](#) that a predicted increase in arrivals over the summer months – coupled with a new Spanish policy to move rescue ships out of the Sea of Alboran and rely more heavily on support from the Moroccan coast guard – would lead to a corresponding spike in migrant fatalities along the Western Mediterranean route. An analysis of trends on migrant fatalities is challenging given that reliable data is limited. While the third quarter of 2019 has seen some [9,715 arrivals to Spain](#) (Spanish mainland, Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla), an increase over the second quarter (6,290), the proportion of recorded fatalities as compared to estimated arrivals has remained consistent. [IOM's Missing Migrants Project](#) has recorded 113 migrant deaths along the Western Mediterranean route in the third quarter of 2019 (1.2%) as compared to 69 reported from April-June 2019 (1.1%). However, a further disaggregation of third quarter numbers by month does show a large jump in September (103) as compared to July (4) and August (6), suggesting that this trend bears further monitoring, and that additional analysis of the prevailing situation in September could be useful.

## Southbound mixed migration

### Migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in Niger

In mid-July some 100 Sudanese asylum seekers demonstrated at the UNHCR office in Agadez, calling for a quicker processing of their asylum applications, and for resettlement to Europe. The [protest](#) appears to have been sparked by reports that some young Somali and Eritrean refugees evacuated from Libya to Niger were being resettled in Europe. Agadez currently hosts some 1,400 Sudanese asylum-seekers who were previously in Libya.

UNHCR's Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) from Libya to Niger seems to have been dormant during the quarter – with an increase of only [two evacuees](#) over the [end of last quarter](#) – as it seeks to [resettle](#) the refugees currently in Niger under the ETM before evacuating more. The total number of evacuees from Libya remaining in Niger stood at [1,055](#) as of 22 September, and by comparing with figures from the end of last quarter, it appears that 373 persons were resettled since the end of [June](#). UNHCR has also negotiated a new intra-African ETM destination, with the Government of Rwanda stating it would accept [500 evacuees](#), and a [first group of 66](#) Eritrean, Somali and Sudanese refugees evacuated there on 26 September.

According to an observer for the NGO [Alarm Phone Sahara](#), some 350 people who had been expelled from Algeria to its border with Niger arrived in Assamaka, Niger on 20 September.

### Nigerian response to attacks against migrants in South Africa

At the beginning of September, attacks in South Africa against migrant owned businesses led to the deaths of at least twelve South Africans and foreign nationals and the flight of more than [1,500 foreign nationals](#). It also resulted in a forceful response from the Nigerian government. Beginning in Johannesburg on 1 September and spreading to Pretoria, looters targeted some [1,000 foreign-owned](#) businesses, including those belonging to Nigerian migrants. This most recent wave of xenophobic violence has precursors, with [attacks against foreigners in 2008](#) killing more than 60 and displacing more than 100,000, and the looting of foreign-owned businesses [in 2015](#) leading to the deaths of seven.

These attacks strained diplomatic relations between Nigeria and South Africa, with the Nigerian government boycotting a meeting of the World Economic Forum held in Capetown and stating its intention to bring more than [600 of its citizens](#) home to preserve their safety. There were also popular [protests](#) targeting South African owned enterprises in Nigeria, at times themselves violent. While South Africa had temporarily closed its diplomatic presence in Nigeria, relations have since improved, with a South African envoy conveying his "[sincerest apologies](#)" to Nigeria's government.

# Thematic focus: West African migration through the Americas – journey into limbo<sup>1</sup>

West Africa is a region characterized by a long-standing culture of migration, to a variety of destinations and for a variety of reasons. While there has been substantial media, research and programmatic focus on migration from West Africa towards Europe, the majority of West African migration is [intra-regional](#), and there is substantial migration towards North Africa and elsewhere on the continent. However, recently there has been a surge in inter-continental movement of West Africans gaining attention. West Africans – and Africans more broadly – have been traveling to South America by plane or [boat](#) and journeying northward, generally seeking to enter the US, although as this becomes increasingly difficult, [stating intentions to travel to Canada](#) as well. While the numbers making the journey are small in comparison to other routes, and small compared to the numbers of Central Americans trying to make new lives in the US, it is nonetheless a consequential phenomenon.

## Who is going and why?

While as early as 2010 [UNHCR](#) was pointing to a rise in asylum seekers from Africa and Asia traveling to South America before joining northward mixed migration routes, the phenomenon has recently gained new momentum. [Some 4,779 Africans](#) were apprehended in Mexico from January through July of 2019, which is almost a fourfold increase over the same period the previous year. As of the end of August, somewhere between [1,500](#) and [3,000](#) were stranded in the southern Mexican city of Tapachula. There are not comprehensive figures available for the Africans who are waiting at the northern Mexican border with the US, but they appear to number in the hundreds, perhaps thousands, and have been reported across its breadth, from [Tijuana](#) to [Ciudad Juarez](#) to [Nuevo Laredo](#).

It is not easy to pinpoint numbers of West African refugees and migrants journeying northwards through the Americas, and the above figures are fragmentary and may include some overlap. However, they clearly illustrate an upward trend. It is equally challenging to find precise nationality breakdowns of these West Africans. News reports have alluded to West Africans from a variety of countries including [Mauritania](#), [Ghana](#), [Togo](#), [Nigeria](#), [Gambia](#). A [communique](#) issued by Africans at Mexico's southern border also mentions the presence of persons from Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Senegal and Sierra Leone. Reasons given for making the arduous journey include persecution on the basis of [race](#), [sexual orientation and political affiliation](#). [Cameroonians](#) predominate in the media coverage; tens of thousands of anglophone Cameroonians have fled the country since [armed conflict](#) flared at the end of 2017, resulting in the deaths of some 1,850 persons and the internal displacement of approximately 530,000. Africans from other nations across the continent are also represented, including from [Eritrea](#), [DRC](#) and [Angola](#).

<sup>1</sup> This thematic focus contains excerpts from the article [Caught in the middle: West African migration through the Americas](#).

## Humanitarian and protection challenges

Policies of the US and Mexican governments have evolved in the last quarter, and African refugees and migrants have found themselves caught out. These increasingly deterrent policies have negatively impacted their access to asylum and exposed them to humanitarian and protection challenges.

Having flown or sailed from Africa to South America, an overland journey through Central America is typically the next step for West Africans seeking to reach the US. Departing from Ecuador, a common jumping-off point due to its [relaxed visa regime](#), migrants must cross the Darien Gap, roughly 100 miles of swampy jungle spanning the border between Colombia and Panama. It is characterized by [BBC](#) as “one of the most dangerous jungles on earth, full of drug cartels, bandits and poisonous animals.” There are no roads, and those who make the trek must carry all their supplies and possessions. People become separated from their group. Drownings are common. African refugees and migrants who have made the journey speak of its difficulty and trauma, including the dead bodies they saw en route. Even beyond the challenges of the Darien Gap, migrants face serious violations, including [robbery, extortion](#) and [hostile treatment by authorities](#).

Surviving the journey is the first step, but African asylum seekers face substantial challenges upon arriving at the border. For instance, the US policy of “[metering](#)” has caused a major bottleneck at the Mexico/US border. [Valery](#), a Cameroonian in Tijuana, Mexico explained that he had not expected the long waiting list that governs the right merely to enter the US to make an asylum claim, saying “I’m surprised! We are begging for a place to stay, as a refugee. His number on the waiting list is 3,500, and as of mid-August, he had been in Tijuana for more than 70 days. Reporting from mid-July suggested wait times of [7-9 months](#) at the San Ysidro port of entry connecting Tijuana to San Diego, and that was before the new asylum ban was allowed to take effect. These refugees and migrants do not have legal status in Mexico, having entered on 20 day tourist visas, known as [salvoconductos](#), that do not allow for employment or access to formal healthcare or housing, and in any case will have long since expired.

Further south in Tapachula, near the Mexico/Guatemala border, more Africans are stranded, no longer able even to obtain the [salvoconducto](#) that would allow them to pass to Mexico’s northern border. As is the case throughout the journey, refugees and migrants here depend on [voluntary assistance](#) from civil society, charitable organizations and the local population. While Mexican security forces surveil the encampment, the [humanitarian contribution](#) of the authorities has been scanty beyond the provision of an ambulance and some portable toilets. As of the end of September, hundreds were living in tents – during the rainy season – and relying on rain and a nearby stream for cooking water. According to Diop Abou from [Mauritania](#), “This isn’t a camp for migrants. It is a prison... We are tired. We sleep in the street. We don’t know when we will leave. We are not given food or drink.”

## Specific obstacles for African refugees and migrants

Language can prove a barrier for Africans in Mexico or at the US border, and this may have particular consequences when dealing with authorities and the complicated bureaucratic and legal processes related to asylum. African asylum-seekers in Tapachula have raised this issue, stating, “at no time have we had [translation into our languages](#),” going on to say that they have been made to sign documents they don’t understand. Africans may face [racism](#) in Mexico, which can also play into their decision-making when considering lodging an asylum claim there. They are less likely than Central Americans to have [family or personal connections](#), meaning that they are likely to spend more time in migrant shelters in the US or Mexico and to have less social capital to draw on as they navigate the asylum system. In many cases they do not have access to [consular support](#), which can pose a particular problem for those whose documents have been lost or stolen in transit. Spending substantial amounts of [money](#) to travel extra-continently, and frequently having lost further resources to pay for the help of smugglers, or to extortion or theft, can leave people in dire financial circumstances.

African refugees and migrants caught in limbo at Mexico’s [northern](#) and [southern](#) borders have organized protests seeking to improve their situations. However, beyond some support from local [civil society](#) and charitable organizations, it is not clear that anyone else is taking responsibility. According to [Salva Lacruz](#), coordinator of the human rights organization Fray Matías de Córdoba, “In the case of (persons from) Honduras and El Salvador, the situation has dramatic overtones. But with these people (migrants from Africa, Cuba, Haiti and South Asia), there are overtones of tragedy and a brutal humanitarian crisis. They have no options.”


## Highlighted new research and reports



### [Au Nigeria, la difficile réintégration des migrants rapatriés au lendemain du cauchemar libyen, Le](#)

#### **Monde, September 2019.**

This article shares the story of several young Nigerian returnees from Libya, shedding light on the challenges of reintegration. 14,000 Nigerians have returned from Libya since 2017, and even with assistance programs like those offered by Edo State – a major migrant sending region – and IOM, they face a difficult road. With 55% unemployment among those under 35 years old, the economic climate is a challenge for all, but returnees may also have debt taken on by themselves or their family to finance their journey, and frequently are dealing with psychological trauma from their experience. They also face stigma in their communities of origin, in some cases seen as benefiting from “preferential treatment” due to the small amounts of support they may receive from the state or international organizations, in other cases blamed for a recent rise in crime.



### [Crossing Paths: A Respondent Driven Sampling survey of migrants and refugees in Nouadhibou, Mauritania](#)

#### **UNHCR, July 2019.**

Using Respondent Driven Sampling – a version of snowball sampling specifically intended to sample hard-to-reach populations – UNHCR carried out a survey of migrants and refugees in Nouadhibou, Mauritania. The findings estimate the population of migrants and refugees in Nouadhibou at approximately 10,000, of which about three quarters are male. The majority of these are from Mali, and work in fishing and construction. The survey also found that the majority of migrants and refugees did not intend to move onward to Europe, and had instead come to Mauritania to seek work or asylum.



European dominance of migration policy in Niger: “On a fait les filles avant la mère”

**Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM), September 2019.**


This briefing paper is based on 41 interviews carried out in March of 2019 with policy makers, politicians, civil society and academic experts. Considering Nigerien migration policy and external influence thereon, it argues that migration policy in Niger has been dominated by European interests, but that the Nigerien government has also been able to capitalize on this involvement to consolidate its strength. It highlights, for instance, the greater emphasis and funding directed towards a migration control approach as compared to a response to forced displacement in Niger. It also points to the international support provided to the development of the National Strategy to Counter Irregular Migration while work on a comprehensive national migration policy was stalled due to lack of funds. The paper concludes with recommendations for the government of Niger, the EU and its member states and other international actors.



Exploring assumptions behind ‘voluntary’ returns from North Africa.

**Refugee Studies Centre, August 2019.**

This paper draws on ethnographic research undertaken in Senegal to shed light on the experiences of returnees from North Africa and evaluate the objectives of IOM’s assisted voluntary return programming taking these experiences into account. It emphasizes the fact that migrants are also returning from North Africa without external assistance and that often returned migrants will still have plans to migrate again in future, despite reintegration programs. While migrants may wish to undertake a future migratory journey through legal means, these are out of reach for most if not all, and therefore alternatives, such as traveling via Morocco, were raised.



## [Migrants as Messengers : The Impact of Peer-to-Peer Communication on Potential Migrants in Senegal - Impact Evaluation Report](#)

### **IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, 2019.**

This report examines the efficacy of and lessons learned from IOM’s Migrant as Messengers (MaM) peer-to-peer sensitization campaign, which was carried out in Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal from December 2017 to March 2019. The evaluation focused on MaM’s town hall events in which video testimonies from returned migrants were coupled with audience Q&A with the returnees. Impact was measured through a randomized controlled trial designed to assess the perceptions, information levels, knowledge and intention to migrate irregularly of potential migrants. It found that those who participated in the MaM events, rather than a “placebo” film screening without migration-related content, showed measurable effects in some areas: a 19% greater likelihood to report feeling well informed about migration risks and opportunities; a 25% greater awareness of risks associated with irregular migration; and a 20% smaller likelihood of reporting intentions to migrate irregularly within the following two years. The evaluation showed limited effects in other areas, particularly related to knowledge of economic or legal information relevant to migration decision-making, or regarding perception of chances to arrive and remain in Europe.



## [Partners in Crime ? The Impacts of Europe's Outsourced Migration Controls on Peace, Stability and Rights](#)

### **Saferworld, July 2019.**


This report examines European “externalization of border controls” in several “partner” countries, including Niger, highlighting the problems that these policies can cause for migrants as well as the broader effects they may have on conflict dynamics. It concludes with recommendations for the EU and its member governments and to advocates, political and civil society actors in Europe and “partner” countries. The chapter on Niger provides a historical overview of European involvement with migration in West Africa, emphasizing the security-centric approach and highlighting the role that these early migration management efforts played as a model for European policies in other regions. It points to the dangers of channeling development funding into security measures, both in terms of undermining human development and potentially leading to corruption and other negative governance outcomes. It looks at Agadez as an example of how criminalizing migration can push migrants into riskier clandestine situations and onto more dangerous routes, while at the same time undermining local livelihoods.



## [“You Pray for Death”: Trafficking of Women and Girls in Nigeria](#)

### **Human Rights Watch, August 2019.**

Nigeria is routinely recognized as a country with substantial numbers of trafficking victims abroad. This report details human rights abuses perpetrated against Nigerians – primarily women – who are trafficked outside of Nigeria, as well as non-Nigerians trafficked into the country. It examines the background to the human trafficking crisis in Nigeria; abuses and impacts of trafficking into sexual and labor exploitation; life in Nigeria after trafficking; shelters and survivor services; and legal obligations for Nigerian under national, regional and international frameworks. Demonstrating how some assistance for victims of trafficking may actually violate their rights further, the report identifies recommendations for the Nigerian government to better combat trafficking and provide the necessary support to its victims.



The MMC is a global network consisting of six regional hubs and a central unit in Geneva engaged in data collection, research, analysis and policy development on mixed migration. The MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis and expertise on mixed migration. The MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. The MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

The MMC is part of and governed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and global and regional MMC teams are hosted by the DRC offices in Amman, Copenhagen, Dakar, Geneva, Nairobi, Tunis and Yangon.

**For more information visit:**

[mixedmigration.org](https://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

